Fethullah Gülen’s Philosophy of Education in Practice

Ruth Woodhall

In this study I first examine Gülen’s own writings and statements about education and show how Gülen’s educational philosophy is reflected in practice in the movement's activities. I argue that measuring the achievements of the movement indicates that the application of Gülen’s philosophy is the key to the success of themovement. This study depends to a large extent on my own experience of working within the movement in a number of different locations and roles over a period of almost ten years.

The purpose of education

Throughout his public life, Gülen has taught that learning is a duty for all humans and “by fulfilling it we attain the rank of true humanity and become a beneficial element of society” (Ünal and Williams 2000:308). Gülen is not only addressing the education of children in his writings but the education of all. The participants in themovement see themselves as learning or attempting to learn all the time and the dominant theme of the movement is the struggle for self-improvement.

Any school or education system anywhere in the world conveys values overtly and covertly, directly and incidentally, deliberately and inadvertently. Given freedom to choose, parents choose schools whose educational philosophy aligns with their own moral values. Some parents may prefer the values of private schools, often out of disagreement with public schools’ official positions on social issues, while others may ascribe a higher quality to them.

Gülen and movement participants are not so disingenuous as to pretend that there is such a thing a value-neutral education system.Gülen’s opinions on the value of education do not differ markedly from the mainstream Muslim view. However, he emphasizes good deeds carried out collectively, and stresses that men and women who cooperate in good works, or meet to discuss the experience and planning of good works are doing a special service (Özdalga 2000:94).Gülen emphasizes the importance of collective consultation and work in his teachings (Gülen 2005:43–58; Sykiainen 2007:126–8) and by example in his personal life (Kalyoncu 2008). This emphasis is reflected in the movement in participants’ use of collective consultation and decision making in educational projects at a local level (Kalyoncu in press:42; Irvine 2007:66, 74–5). In my experience of working in the movement in educational, publishing and intercultural institutions, the movement’s interpretation of collective action is enacted as a genuine collegiality and professionalism, and this always involves consultation and cooperation with interested parties in the environment of the institution.

Thus, for Gülen movement participants, when conscientiously performed, education has beneficial effects for individuals and the global community (Ünal and Williams 2000:306). Gülen believes that this approach is advanced by tolerance and patience and not by the suppression of opposition or the use of force. He states, “Improving a community is possible by elevating the coming generations to the rank of humanity, not by obliterating the bad ones” (The Fountain 2002:71).But for Gülen, education is not utilitarian; it is integral to his philosophy and religious world view. This world view is naturally shared by many in Turkey (Kalyoncu 2008) The Gülen movementoriginated as a faith-based with a strong cultural identity, but its educational and cultural projects are spreading into regions where world views have neither Turkic nor Islamic roots. Participants and supporters feel they have proved that the high-quality secular education and moral values combined with the altruism of teachers and sponsors are universal values which appeal to people all over the world.

Religious Knowledge and the Natural Sciences

Many commentators have argued that Muslim educators must address the relationship between Islam and modernity. Gülen acknowledges that this relationship has been problematic, especially in the natural sciences, but indicates that according to his understanding of Islam, the perceived conflict between religious knowledge and science is falsely conceived (Ünal and Williams 2000:316–17). To answer skeptics, Gülen refers pointedly to the opinions of the twentieth century’s greatest scientist:

Einstein said that science teaches us the relations between phenomena and how phenomena exist together under their specific conditions. He added that science, which consists of the knowledge of what already is, does not teach us what should be; only religion teaches us how things should be and to which goals we should aspire. (Ünal and Williams 2000:45)

Gülen’s educational philosophy derives from his faith, and for him scientific and religious knowledge are essential and complementary parts of the same whole. Gülen movement participants support this synthesis of rational and religious knowledge. Consequently, Gülen-inspired schools value science and mathematics. Most of these schools have excellent computer technology and science laboratories.

The Characteristics of Good Schools

When writing about the qualities of a good school Gülen blends metaphors of science and spirituality and reminds us of the hereafter. Although Gülen vigorously advocates education, he does not offer detailed prescriptions for curriculum or pedagogical techniques. Instead he presents broad guidelines for moral and technical aspects of education. (Ünal and Williams 2000:312)

In addition to being unusually well equipped for the teaching of science, the schools in Turkey, Central Asia and the Balkans tend to have very good English language departments and small classes. These factors aid students’ educational and professional success which attracts the growing educated middle class in Turkey, Central Asia and other non-English-speaking countries.

Between 1998 and 2005, while working on training programs for teachers and administrators in the Gülen-inspired schools in Turkey and Central Asia, I learned that most of the schools covered the national curriculum of the country where they were situated so as to cater for local needs. They then modified this with some additional elements to meet international standards so students could also study in foreign universities. Other schools followed an international curriculum such as the International Baccalaureate. When I worked in the UK in a Gülen-inspired-school, teaching differed from the national curriculum only in that the school also added the Turkish language. Religious studies was given as an after-school option on the request of a child’s parents. In the UK at that time private schools were permitted to set their own curriculum as long as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate judged the school’s performance “satisfactory” and a school’s curriculum could be modified to meet the needs of a particular community (and individuals).

Regular in-service training of teachers and support personnel maintains high standards at Gülen-inspired schools. Schools often join together, in greater or smaller numbers, to provide skills training for personnel. A variety of training methods are used within the schools, including the mentoring of new recruits, guest lecturers, professional trainers, and peer training through workshops. In addition, teachers are funded to attend conferences about teaching. Due to this mandatory training, teachers often work six days a week with only four weeks per year of paid vacation. The professional demands placed on these teachers contrast with the demands placed on Turkish public school teachers, who have comparable salaries but work substantially less.

Administrators also meet, exchange views and experiences, share news from the areas where they work, and discuss good practices and innovations. While other private schools in Turkey also provide training and send teachers to conference and training days, no other group rivals the Gülen movement in sheer numbers and training resources. For example, in July and August 2005, I worked with a publishing company which offered short classroom methodology programs on three four-day pre-semester residential courses, first in Istanbul, then in a small town in central Turkey. Over four hundred teachers from Gülen-inspired schools attended these courses and in most cases their schools funded the course fee. Training programs such as these are offered throughout the year by the major publishing companies which sell textbooks in Turkey and supplemented by smaller weekend and after school conferences and seminars. They are highly appreciated by teachers and administrators for their individual satisfaction and for the benefits they bring to standards in the schools. Özdalga describes the competitive spirit pervading the schools as one of their defining features, pointing to the schools’ awareness of how their students’ results compare with those of other schools, and to the efforts expended on preparing students for “Knowledge Olympics”, where they often win medals (Özdalga 2000:97). For Gülen himself service to humanity and competition with others are not mutually exclusive and success may be evidence of the validity of one’s message (Ünal and Williams 2000:318–19).

Support for the educational activities in the Gülen movement derives from shared values between the schools and communities they serve and is reinforced by the immediate benefits accruing to students and families in terms of improved social relationships and high academic standards (Kalyoncu in press:37, 83–6). From the perspective of organizational theory, shared values legitimize formal and informal local leaders in the eyes of the communities gathered around an organization as the use of normative power resources to influence is invariably seen by those subject to it as legitimate and evokes moral commitment (Hales 1993:27). Since Gülen emphasizes argument rather than force, financial reward, or other external obligation, the mode of influence most often practiced in the Gülen movement is moral persuasion, suggestion or argument. This demonstratesGülen’s insight into human interaction, Students and parents who are less committed to some of the values of the movement are not disadvantaged. Özdalga quotes a teacher in the movement as intending to offer students good quality education and the chance to learn good manners and morals, without any religious instruction, for “with respect to that question, we do not have anything to give as teachers” (Özdalga 2003:68–9).

Observers confirm that the values taught in the schools are, to use Özdalga’s term, “transconfessional”. These are taught indirectly, witnessing by example rather than words; and in a principled way, in that the mode of influence appears to differ little no matter the location of the school. Thomas Michel, who visited a school in the Philippines, commented on the absence of explicit Islamic content in the curriculum and was told that “what they sought to communicate were universal Islamic values such as honesty, hard work, harmony, and conscientious service rather than any confessional instruction (2002:106). There is also no direct teaching of Islam in the curriculum of Gülen-inspired schools in Turkey or Central Asia beyond what is legally required. So, the schools are not “faith schools”, that is, they do not require that students are or become Muslim. This reflects a conscious choice not to use available sources of power and influence in ways that could conceivably be perceived as imposed and illegitimate.

In addition to good relations with people of other religious traditions,Gülen calls for tolerance throughout society and between nations.Movement participants have proved adept at establishing and maintaining multi-faith. multi-ethnic educational institutions. They run educational and cultural projects in, for example, Southeast Turkey, known for ethnic conflict (Kalyoncu in press), and in other regions of the world where ethno-religious conflict is occurring, for example, the Philippines (Michel 2002:105), the Balkans and Central Asia (Ünal and Williams 2000:336–46; Michel 2002:106), or where such conflict is potential or low-level, for example, Germany (Irvine 2007:70–1).

As well as being inclusive as regards religion and ethnicity, Gülen-inspired schools have made a valuable contribution to the education of girls and women in Turkey. All primary schools established bymovement participants are co-educational. In addition, several private high schools for girls set up in Turkey in the 1990s, university preparation courses, and student hostels established by movementsupporters have encouraged many young women to access quality higher education. In the schools the curriculum does not differ for boys and girls and there is the same emphasis on science, math and computing for both sexes. The women working in the educational projects in the movement are often viewed as suitable role models by other Turkish women and the parents of girls (Kalyoncu in press:87). Indeed, when Gülen movement participants first advocated setting up schools for girls, the suggestion was enthusiastically received. I was told by one female administrator in a girls’ school that at the first fundraising meeting before the school’s foundation the women in the meeting immediately donated all the jewelry they were wearing1.

In 1999, after the “soft coup” in Turkey (Çetin 2009), a ban on covering the head was enforced in all educational institutions. The following year, single-sex schools were banned and all the high schools in the movement became co-educational. The bans were perceived by all social actors in Turkey as countermobilizations against educated and practicing Muslim women, especially those holding professional positions or aspirations ([insert cross-reference to Çetin’s paper here, please]; Turam 2007:127). These moves by the state apparatus prevented many practicing Muslim women from entering university, but they did not cause any of the Gülen-inspired schools to close.

The balance of male to female faculty seems to be approximately equal across the Gülen-inspired schools and movement supporters (Boyd 2006:5; Irvine 2007:80–1; Kalyoncu in press:74). Nevertheless, observers sometimes remark on a lack of women in higher and more visible administrative posts in the movement (Stephenson 2007:150–1). Some women in the movement give the ban on the head-covering as one reason for not aspiring to visible roles, such as principal, which would involve representing the school in public2. Turam (2007:128) claims that the ban, far from empowering Muslim women, “has reinforced patriarchal practices”. However, many men in themovement work in the same roles as women and similarly express no desire for career advancement (Stephenson 2007:160 n. 1), and not all women working in the institutions cover their heads outside the workplace. Men and women explain their lack of ambition for higher status or career advancement as an effect of the emphasis on service (hizmet) in the discourse of the movement. Another possible reason for the lack of women in visible leadership roles is the more recent entry of women into the workforce in the institutions and social movement organizations, as the first schools which were established were boys’ schools3.

Although single-sex schools are not permitted in Turkey, Gülen movement participants still encourage girls of all backgrounds to attend school and university (Ünal and Williams 2000:332; Kalyoncu in press:86, 90). Also, in southeastern Turkey, this effort has been extended to literacy classes for adult women in the community around the school (Kalyoncu in press 2007:87).

Characteristics of Good Teachers

Gülen states that parents and a healthy family life are the first essentials of a child’s education and that dysfunctional family life increasingly reflects upon the child’s spirit, and therefore upon society (Ünal and Williams 2000:310–11). In the movement great emphasis is placed, therefore, on the home–school relationship. First, the schools conduct normal, regular parent–teacher meetings in schools, where students’ academic results and general conduct are discussed. Second, every student in a school has a home-room teacher. Throughout the school year these teachers visit the family of each of their students at home outside school hours. Teachers also take after-school clubs, provide extra after-school and weekend tuition and take students on educational visits and field trips. These are all normal practice worldwide throughout the movement. Administrators and teachers believe this extra dedication plays a major role in the success of the schools. All these activities are combined with financial and other material support from the local community, and a tripartite relationship between parents, school and sponsors develops (Aslandoğan and Çetin 2007:49–50).

Gülen calls performance of the superficial, technical aspects of instruction “teaching”, reserving the term “education” for a deeper, more meaningful and holistic activity (Ünal and Williams 2000:312). Notwithstanding the importance that the schools attach to training in practical classroom technique, the teacher is more than a mere purveyor of information or skills. The relationship between teacher and student is crucial: “The best way to educate people is to show a real concern for every individual, not forgetting that each individual is a different ‘world’” (Ünal and Williams 2000:313).

This importance given to the development of the individual in themovement leads to teachers and administrators dedicating extra hours to free after-school and weekend lessons for individuals or small groups. Graduates of the schools, who have started university courses, also return voluntarily to help the students in the following years with their studies and to mentor them (Aslandoğan and Çetin 2007:54). Teachers also form groups or pairs to support new and probationary teachers with planning lessons and clerical tasks associated with teaching. The friendships that result from these voluntary activities build strong feelings of community around schools.

Teachers’ altruism is not confined to sacrificing their time for students. They also make considerable financial sacrifices. Many teachers also sponsor students for part or all of their tuition. Kalyoncu (in press:59) describes sponsors and teachers renovating a half-ruined building for a university preparation course, and I have met teachers in other countries who have done the same. Teachers move from one area to another, and even to other countries to give educational services.

Gülen’s writings on the qualities of good teachers give no indication of the gender of the teachers he is talking about. The fact that there are equal numbers of men and women teachers throughout themovement indicates that the model of the ideal teacher is not in any way gender-related in the eyes of movement participants.

Within the movement, teaching is viewed as service (hizmet) to students, society, the world, and God. This is much more akin to the classical Christian view of teaching as a sacred calling or vocation than to the modern managerial view of teaching as a collection of competencies or measurable goals.

Measuring Achievement

How can the achievement of the schools and other educational activities be assessed or measured? We first consider how far and fast the activities of the movement have spread. We then consider the success of specific goals (the establishment and continuance of particular activities or institutions) and the globality of the issues (Melucci 1999:307–12).

With respect to time and space, the rapidity of the spread of these educational activities and institutions has attracted attention. Gülen movement activities include informal study groups (sohbets) organized by participants to cater for their own education and spiritual needs. These accord with participants’ and supporters’ own needs, wishes, the social environment, and previous knowledge. TheGülen-inspired private primary and secondary schools, university preparation courses, and private universities first sprang up in Turkey and Turkic republics but have now been established in approximately one hundred countries throughout South-East Asia, Africa, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Australia (Zaman 2006). Scholarships are available for talented students who cannot afford the fees. In Western Europe there are community centers or student hostels in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium and Holland. These centers and hostels provide support for those studying in the public education system. Although movement participants have not found it easy to set up schools in the European Union because of the weight of European bureaucracy or tradition, I saw three new schools in the UK in 2007 and Irvine (2007:66) reports three new private high schools in Germany. In addition to educational institutions, Turkish entrepreneurs who share Gülen’s values have established voluntary associations like the Journalists and Writers Foundation, as well as media outlets in television, radio, and print, reflecting Gülen’s view that the mass media should play a part in public education and support the education policy approved by society. (Ünal and Williams 2000:310).

Another measure of success is the achievement of particular aims (Melucci 1999:307–8), such as setting up a school in a particular location, improving the standards of training of a specific group of teachers, and providing a particular holiday course. Gülen counsels precise and thorough planning for new projects (Gülen 1996:75). This planning is always carried out at a local level by supporters and participants of the movement. Before commencing a project, the local group carries out a process of consultation and collective decision-making with all the parties concerned in the local community, including local authorities, parents, sponsors, and Gülen movement participants. Local groups are also carry out and monitor the educational projects so the projects are always adapted to the environment and local needs. (Çetin n.d.; Kalyoncu in press: n.d.)

Gülen also warns that material success is not the only measure. The means must be as legal and legitimate as the goal (Gülen 1996:76). For this reason, the SMOs and institutions are established on a legal basis with fully transparent administrations and accounting systems. Participants obey the law of the land in which they are employed and avoid politicized activities.

The aims of Gülen movement participants and supporters include finding moral values common to different social actors, communities and societies, and the reduction of schism or conflict within and between societies. Through its educational projects, dialogue and media activities, the Gülen movement limits or displaces extremist developments in modern, politicized expressions of Islam and sectarian ideological groups, particularly in Turkey and Central Asia (Ünal and Williams 2000:39; Kalyoncu 2008), and works to develop peaceful and cooperative relationships between communities in all other regions of the world (Michel 2002; Irvine 2007).

Characteristics of the Movement

The spread and success of the movement has been achieved in spite of periods when Gülen and the movement as a whole have come under sustained legal and political attack (Çetin 2009). In this respect, I believe one of the most salient characteristics of the movement is its ability to adapt to varying local conditions and its flexibility in the face of rapid change. Based my observations within the movement, it seems that this adaptability and flexibility are also based on participants’ interpretations of Gülen’s teachings and that Gülen’s own understanding of the dynamics of social change is very advanced.

Three different approaches to understanding change are used by participants in social movements or social movement organizations (and researchers). The first approach sees the organization ormovement as monolithic and focuses on shared qualities and consistent elements such as language, beliefs, rituals, leaders, and other aspects of culture. The organization in question disregards, downplays and even denies the existence of differences and variety within it (Meyerson and Martin 1987:32–3). This view, however, can account for only some of the features of the Gülen movement, for example, the majority of its members are Turkish, Muslim, share a language, beliefs, and national rituals (public holidays, etc.).

This analysis of organizations as hierarchical holds out the prospect of change initiated and managed from above, but at the same time is forced to acknowledge the likelihood of “persistence, inertia and thus resistance to change” at the level of “deeper manifestations of culture, such as taken-for-granted assumptions and understandings that underlie behavioral norms or artifacts”. (Meyerson and Martin 1987:33)

In reality, in the Gülen movement, language, beliefs, and other cultural tropes are not shared by all movement volunteers. There is no centralization or central control. Decision making for projects and activities is localized and therefore there is no pyramidal structure or strict ranking, only local, rather flat professional hierarchies within SMOs and institutions. The lack of central control also means that there is no way of knowing whether movement participants and supporters have fully understood the principles of the movement so there is variation in participants’ levels of understanding. While some of Gülen’s writings show his appreciation of Turkish language, beliefs and cultural practices, his emphasis on universal values, appreciation of other national cultures, and dialogue indicate that he does not support a view of the movement as hierarchical.

The second model sees organizations as consisting of a set of subcultures that share some elements of a dominant culture. Variety rather than uniformity is the key to this view and the social environment plays a much greater role (Meyerson and Martin 1987:35). This second viewpoint is found among those who have worked in educational institutions set up by movement supporters in different locations or countries, on a variety of projects, and in different roles. It allows a number of different kinds of “belonging” which require less narrow conformity.

In contrast to the view of change within an organization or culture as “top-down,” directed, and revolutionary, in the subcultures model change is localized, incremental and stimulated by the environment. This means that the effects of local changes on the organization as a whole are difficult to predict and control (Meyerson and Martin 1987:37). This view supports Gülen’s claim that he is neither a leader nor knowledgeable about the schools founded in the name of his ideas. It also accounts satisfactorily for the adaptability and subsequent success of the schools, universities and other projects in widely varying cultures and locations across the world. Schools and other projects are often set up by sponsors in ways that suggest that this model is employed within the movement. Small groups of two or three schools are established under a governing body, sometimes a small trust and sometimes a small company, with a board of trustees or directors respectively, in such a way that the governing body may respond to local demands rapidly and without central restrictions.

In this view, the occurrence of regular meetings of participants working in the same or similar positions in different schools and institutions is less evidence of a hierarchical structure than of an attempt to counteract the problems this kind of devolved structure has with communications. Such meetings encourage but do not impose the spread of particular valued innovations where they may be found suitable to other local conditions, while allowing local control to continue to operate.

The third model of change, instead of positing a monolith or a set of subcultures, accepts ambiguity Agreement, disagreement, ignorance and confusion all coexist and boundaries within and around the organization are permeable, so various internal sub-cultures and influences from the environment gain and lose prominence (Meyerson and Martin 1987:38). Of the three models, the third places the most emphasis on individuals. The organization or movement is a network and individuals, as nodes on the network, may be in more than one relationship at any one time.

The advantage of the network model is that it allows participants a great deal of autonomy, allowing them to experiment with little risk of repercussion as causes of failure and even the criteria by which to judge failure are not clear. It therefore endows the individual with an attractive sense of autonomy. This kind of approach is useful in settings like classrooms, publishing, cross-cultural business and inter-organizational negotiations, where change is constant and a key element of the activity itself (Meyerson and Martin 1987:40).

The correspondence between the range of activities in the Gülen movement and those listed in this analysis is striking. This inclusive network model appeals to those for whom the notion of belonging to a social group is less important and is found among “front-line” or pioneering groups wherever a new project or new and atypical type of project is in the process of being established and draws heavily on resources from a new social environment.

Gülen’s emphasis on getting scientific knowledge from the West is an argument for the permeable boundaries demanded by this model. The expansion of the movement’s activities into other countries also indicates the relevance of this model to the movement. The drive for formal and informal contacts and dialogue with other groups, as evinced by interfaith and intercultural activities initiated bymovement participants is another sign of an appreciation of other cultures. At an individual level too, the tolerance of ambiguity characteristic of this model is made explicit. Gülen recognizes the potential for moral ambiguity within human beings and counsels a lenient response (Gülen 1996:87). He asks that this compassionate attitude should typify all encounters (Gülen 1996:19). He argues that even our less attractive characteristics, such as ambition and love of status and fame, can be turned to good use and we should not be quick to condemn others (Gülen 1996:88).

The network model stresses individual adjustment to changes in the environment. Change is therefore continual, almost uncontrollable, and usually undetectable, since there is no stable background against which to measure it. This view of change accords perfectly withGülen’s urging of participants and volunteers to greater individual effort through his books, published talks, and journals, and periodicals.

Conclusion: The Future of the Movement

I believe that it is only the harmony between Gülen’s philosophy of education and the cultural practice of his movement participants which can explain adequately the continuing growth and success of the movement. It is difficult to hold in mind and use more than one of the models described here at the same time and yet without this ability an individual or a movement will have many “blind spots” and will miss many valuable sources of change. It is my contention thatGülen and the Gülen movement are able to work with multiple models simultaneously.

The qualities of Fethullah Gülen and the huge variety of circumstances in which movement participants labor must raise the issue of alternative future forms of organization and institutionalization. However, if, as I have argued, many Gülen movement volunteers have understood the elements of his teachings outlined here, the movement’s features, especially its collective consultation and decision taking and its inclusiveness, its openness to innovation, may allow it to continue to adapt and grow.

References Cited

• Aslandoğan, Yüksel and Muhammed Çetin, 2007 “Gülen’s Educational Paradigm in Thought and Practice”. In Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, ed. Robert A. Hunt and Yüksel A. Aslandoğan, pp. 35–61.
• Aslandoğan, Yüksel and Robert Hunt, 2007 Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. New Jersey: The Light, Inc.
• Boyd, Barbara, 2006 “A Comparison: The Wisdom of Fethullah Gülen and the Truth of Parker Palmer, Enlightened Education as the Key to Global Transformation”. paper presented at theSecond Annual Conference on Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice, organized by Department of Religious Studies at University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, the Institute of Interfaith Dialog, Texas, and Petree College of Art and Sciences at Oklahoma City University, November 3-5, 2006, at University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, U.S.A. pp.17.
• Çetin, Muhammed, 2009 The Gulen Movement: Civic Service without Borders. Blue Dome Press
• Hales, Colin, “Power, authority and influence.” InOrganizational Effectiveness and Improvement in Education, ed. A. Harris, N. Bennett, and M. Preedy, pp. 22–30. Buckingham: Open University Press.
• Irvine, Jill, 2007 “The Gülen Movement and Turkish Integration in Germany”. In Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, ed. Robert A. Hunt and Yüksel A. Aslandoğan, pp. 62–84.
• Kalyoncu, Mehmet, 2008 A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gulen Movement in Southeast Turkey. New Jersey: The Light, Inc.
• Melucci, Alberto,1999 Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (First edition 1996).
• Meyerson, Debra and Joanne Martin,1987 “Cultural Change: an integration of three different views”. In Organizational Effectiveness and Improvement in Education, ed. A. Harris, N. Bennett, and M. Preedy, pp. 22–30. Buckingham: Open University Press.
• Özdalga, Elisabeth, 2003 “Secularizing Trends in Fethullah Gülen’s Movement: Impasse or Opportunity for Further Renewal?”. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 12(1), 61–73 (Spring 2003)
• Sykiainen, Leonid, 2007 “Democracy and the Dialogue between Western and Islamic Legal Cultures: The Gülen Case”. InMuslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, ed. Robert A. Hunt and Yüksel A. Aslandoğan, pp. 121–132.
• Turam, Berna, 2007 Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
• Ünal, Ali and Alphonse Williams, eds. Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen. Fairfax, VA: The Fountain.
• Zaman, 2006 “Istanbul Fascinates Turkish Olympiad Competitors”, June 19. Available from:http://en.fgulen.com/content/view/2262/22/

Published on FethullahGulenForum.org, 14 November 2009, Saturday

Hizmetophobia: A by-product of the Turkish Muslim Spring

by Ali. H. Aslan (Today's Zaman) The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recently issued its latest annual report with an embarrassingly long Turkey section. In addition to the problems of minority non-Muslims and Alevis, the commission has also alluded to those of majority Sunni Muslims in Turkey. But a useful term that would describe the main reason for their suffering was missing: Islamophobia.

Islamophobia has been in the veins of the post-Ottoman Turkish republican regime since it was established in 1923. Many founders of the Republic of Turkey were secularist-positivists who held deep reservations about the institution of religion, especially organized Islam. Hence, they employed immense pressure (open and covert) to cleanse religion from public and even private life in this majority Muslim nation. Centuries-old Islamic missions were banned. At one point, teaching the Muslim holy book the Qur’an was illegal. Religious lifestyles often resulted in job and promotion denial, or even expulsion, in some key government institutions, such as the military. For decades, Turkey’s secularist establishment has used religious Muslims and movements as a bogeyman. Generals have staged several coups in the name of protecting their highly sacred secularism from an inflated fundamentalism threat. Luckily, despite such systemic repression, pious Muslims have generally not turned to violence or fundamentalism, thanks to the maturity of Turkish Sufi Islamic tradition. Instead, they have pursued a struggle for rights and freedoms by pushing for democratization. Becoming more transparent and helping with the nation’s transformation simultaneously, they have integrated into an increasingly democratic system. Unlike the so-called Arab Spring, the Turkish Spring, largely to the credit of religious conservatives, was brought about via a long, painstaking and peaceful process of reform rather than chaotic and bloody revolutions. Although it’s still a work in progress, Turkey has come a long way in becoming both modern and Muslim. As a result of democratic corrections, the once underdog religious elements are now less and less underrepresented in the public and private arenas. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) as a political party and Hizmet (aka the Fethullah Gülen movement) as a civic movement are two leading examples. Obviously, pro-status quo elements within the Turkish establishment do not take these developments well. Their fear of Islam has been reinforced by the fear of change in their privileged status. They claim Turkey is heading towards an autocratic theocracy, even though the country has become a demonstrative case for the cohabitation of Islam and democracy. At the epicenter of the Islamophobic hullabaloo lately is the Hizmet (which means “service” in Turkish) movement. Hizmet sympathizers operate in Turkey and all over the globe with their schools, businesses, community services, etc. They stress scientific progress, the fight against poverty and disease and promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue. The world definitely needs more such activities, but some people seem to hate the movement no matter what. The anti-Hizmet conspiracy theories are abundant, reminiscent of anti-Semitic rhetoric: “Gülenists” have “infiltrated” every important corner, they secretly took over Turkey and seek eventual world domination in the name of Islam. Fortunately, in response to decades-long authoritarian practices, Hizmet people have developed survival techniques against carnivorous witch-hunts. For example, they keep a low profile in important government institutions. That further annoys and frightens Islamophobic Turks who now visualize an invisible Hizmet hand behind every development in Turkey that they dislike. And lately they have been increasingly finding allies in the West as well. It is understandable that Hizmet is undergoing more scrutiny, given its enhanced influence at home and abroad. No human enterprise is immune from mistakes, so any constructive criticism is more than welcome. What’s troubling, however, is people looking at this important movement through lenses usually blurred with negative prejudices related to the movement’s religious roots. So far, many actions against Hizmet have been taken under the considerable influence of Islamophobia. The USCIRF report points to recent Turkish military plans that allegedly involve secretly planting weapons in the houses of college students who sympathize with Hizmet so that they could label the movement as terrorist. In the US, anti-Hizmet groups engage in smear campaigns (mostly through websites) targeting schools established by sympathizers of the movement. A recent worrying development has been concerted efforts in Turkey and the West to portray Hizmet overall as a major obstacle to press freedom. The arrest of former police official Hanefi Avci and journalist Ahmet Şık in conjunction with two separate anti-terror cases prompted the following conspiracy theory: All this happened because Hizmet sympathizers in the state apparatus wanted to hush their critics. The theory fails to explain why scores of others who also harshly criticize the movement are untouched, not to mention the hundreds of continuing prosecutorial actions against Hizmet-friendly journalists and intellectuals. Clearly, most lapses in freedom in Turkey stem from the less-than-perfect Constitution and laws, an archaic judicial system and a fading, but still alive, national-security state culture. However, a small but influential chorus insists on blaming “Hizmet” for almost all of the ills and democratic shortcomings in the country. They seem to ignore the huge contributions of the movement to reform. I don’t expect rational thinking from Turkey’s narrow-minded secularists and fanatic ultranationalists. However, seeing a similarly paranoid attitude lately even among some relatively open-minded liberal intellectuals has been heartbreaking and disappointing. I suspect concerns about preserving a secular lifestyle in an increasingly religion-friendly nation have made some liberals more susceptible to the Islamophobia virus. Nowadays several Western media organizations, probably under the Turkish liberal-secularist influence, are joining the Hizmet-skeptical chorus. Along with the Şık and Avci cases, Today’s Zaman parting ways with columnist Andrew Finkel has been presented as evidence of Hizmet’s intolerance for free speech. Does anybody ask the consent of millions of Hizmet sympathizers when such decisions are taken? No. (I know for a fact, because if I had been asked, I would have said “no” to Finkel’s firing.) How, then, could an increasingly decentralized civic movement such as Hizmet be held as a whole responsible for the perceived mistakes of its individual sympathizers or their autonomously run -- that is, not run by Hizmet -- institutions? Hizmetophobia, as a version of Islamophobia, is wrong. I call on all Hizmet critics in Turkey and abroad to refrain altogether from negatively stereotyping a widespread civic movement without presenting credible evidence other than conspiracy theories, gossip and personal fears. Instead, genuine efforts must be made to analyze this crucial movement with an open mind. That would provide valuable advice and constructive criticism for Hizmet as well as lessons for the larger Muslim Spring.

Misrepresentation of Fethullah Gülen in English-language media

by Mehmet Kalyoncu Fethullah Gülen For an average American and European reader, the name Fethullah Gülen may not necessarily be a familiar one. That Gülen is a scholar who has inspired millions of volunteers across the world to engage in educational and intercultural initiatives, that he publically denounced Osama bin Laden for the shame that the latter brought upon Islam, and that he advocated Turkey’s full membership in the European Union at time when his counterparts opposed it by simply viewing the EU as a Christian club with Zionist touches, are not something that the average reader would know, either. Recently the English-language media have been increasingly covering Gülen and the worldwide civil society initiatives he has inspired. However, the language in general and the way certain politically significant words can be used in some of this media coverage are somewhat problematic in the sense that they fail to present the full picture about Gülen, if not deliberately create doubts and prejudices about him Recently, it seems, the English-language media, and particularly American and European media, are increasingly covering Gülen and the worldwide civil society initiatives he has inspired. However, the language in general and the way certain politically significant words are used in some of this media coverage are somewhat problematic in the sense that they fail to present the full picture about Gülen, if not deliberately create doubts and prejudices about him. A recent Financial Times report titled “Turkey: Inspiring or insidious” by Delphine Strauss as well as reports by two Turkey-based correspondents, Amberin Zaman of The Economist and Claire Berlinski of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, are quite indicative of such a tendency. In so doing, they appear to appeal to a basic human instinct of fearing what one cannot comprehend, contain or control, and as a result developing a hostile attitude toward it. These reports also consistently belittle Turkey’s efforts to reckon with its antidemocratic past through the Ergenekon investigation on the alleged involvements of active duty and retired army and police officers, journalists, bureaucrats and others in coup plots, thereby raising doubts about their journalistic objectivity and neutrality on either subject. Financial Times’ insidious coverage “But in Turkey, opinion is sharply divided between those who see Mr. Gülen as a force for social mobility and tolerance, and those who suspect he is insidiously undermining the country’s secular foundations,” writes Strauss. First of all, it is hard to say that opinion in Turkey is sharply divided with regard to Gülen. As of today, there has been no poll carried out by Turkish researchers or authorities to determine public opinion about him. However, according to a poll conducted by Professor Akbar Ahmed of American University, for his book, “Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization,” 84 percent of Turks have a favorable opinion of Gülen and the initiatives he has inspired. In addition, a poll carried out by the magazines Foreign Policy of the United States and Prospect of the United Kingdom demonstrated that Gülen is the world’s top public intellectual. In the aftermath of this poll, some apparently unpleased with the result claimed that the “followers” of Gülen had rigged the poll. One wonders what the difference is between simply voting for someone and rigging a poll. Would one of the candidates not eventually come first in the poll? If it another candidate was voted the world’s top public intellectual, then would his or her supporters not have “rigged” but “voted” for that candidate? At the end of the day, any poll can be misleading depending on how one designs it. Perhaps, it is about time to carry out multiple polls in Turkey by various pollsters in order to assess whether opinion about Gülen is “sharply divided” or if it is just a small marginal group that opposes him and the initiatives he has inspired. Strauss further suggests, “His followers have been described as ‘Islamic Jesuits’ -- and as Turkey’s equivalent of Opus Dei.” Again, this is another simplistic method increasingly utilized in order to reduce Gülen to just another charismatic religious leader, and his admirers as blind followers of that leader. It is also a somewhat derogatory description of them, which aims to inject into the reader’s mind doubt about their true intentions. The word “follower” has quite a loaded meaning and can be easily exploited. What does it mean to follow? Follow to achieve what, or get to where? Who is more of a “follower” -- the young college graduate who foregoes job offers with lucrative salaries and volunteers to go to a country which he or she cannot even point out on the map, in order to help that country’s children receive a modern education; the woman who donates everything, including her wedding ring, to support the start-up of a school, which she is most unlikely to visit in her lifetime; the Assyrian Christian priest who is thankful for and supports Gülen’s interfaith dialogue efforts; the Jewish businessman who vouches for the apolitical nature of a Gülen-inspired Turkish school in a foreign country; an atheist writer who participates in the activities of the Journalists and Writers Foundation (GYV), which is associated with Gülen; the Turkish diplomat who is proud to see a Gülen-inspired school in a country where even the Turkish state does not have official representation; or, one who follows Gülen’s twitter account? So, who is a “follower” of Gülen? What does it take to become a so-called “Gülen follower”? How many unsubstantiated allegations make one credible premise? Moreover, what does it mean “... have been described as Islamic Jesuits?” Who is it that makes such a description? It may well be one of those currently detained because of alleged involvement in alleged coup plots, or someone who is unhappy with the ongoing Ergenekon investigation on the alleged outlawed network nested in the army, police, bureaucracy and other parts of the state apparatus. Why would the Financial Times use such an unsubstantiated allegation? Does such a statement have any credibility without a reference to its source? As it stands, it is hardly different from mere defamation of Gülen and his admirers under the disguise of “neutral” reporting. This defamation is further deepened by likening what is called the Gülen movement to Opus Dei, which is known to Westerners as a secretive, powerful and controversial formation within the Catholic Church. After all, how credible would it be if a newspaper report read, “It is widely believed that the Financial Times and the other media outlets owned by Jewish media moguls like Rupert Murdock are intentionally misrepresenting Fethullah Gülen and his admirers, whom they think are the driving force behind Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party [AK Party] government, which they adamantly want to get rid of due to Israel’s growing uneasiness with Turkey under that government.” Just like the Financial Times’ quote of unsubstantiated allegations about Gülen by unreferenced sources, this quotation would not have any credibility, either. Perhaps the answer as to why the Financial Times is using such language is in the report itself: “Yet there is little doubt that the movement [Gülen] inspires is now an important force shaping Turkish society, part of a broader evolution in which leaders emerging from a religious, business-minded middle class are gradually eclipsing older, fiercely secular, elites.” Objective observers of Turkey would rather say, “Older, fiercely secular, elites, who have traditionally dominated the economic and political spaces as well as the state apparatus, who did not refrain from resorting to anti-democratic and criminal practices from targeted killings and massacres of civilians to military coups ousting democratically elected governments, and some of whom as a result of recent democratic reforms and transformations in state institutions are being investigated for their alleged involvement in these criminal acts.” Moreover, Strauss argues, with regard to the Gülen-inspired schools, “Though officials from the traditionally secularist foreign ministry have tended to keep their distance from Gülen-inspired projects, ministers appear to view them as a useful extension of Turkey’s soft power.” Here too, the report seems like it is aiming to instill two misleading perceptions about these schools: One is that the Turkish diplomatic corps is generally not sympathetic to the contributions these schools are making to the emergence of a positive image of Turkey abroad; and the other is that they are instruments of a new Turkish foreign policy orientation that is associated with the AK Party government. First of all, it is increasingly evident that in most of the countries where these schools operate, Turkish diplomats, regardless of them being conservative (if there are any) or secular, seem to publicly appreciate these schools or other Gülen-inspired initiatives. Unless Strauss knows of something more than meets the eye, then the Financial Times reporter’s allegation is wrong at best, if not intentionally misleading. Secondly, when the first Gülen-inspired school was established outside Turkey, those with whom the new Turkish foreign policy orientation is associated today were still either students at college or junior professionals in bureaucracy and academia. So, unless they miraculously initiated these schools some 20 years ago in order to lay the groundwork for the foreign policy orientation that Turkey pursues today, the view that these schools are “extensions” of Turkey’s soft power, which the Financial Times report attributes to AK Party government ministers, is as well misleading, if not purposefully trying to give these apolitical civil society initiatives a political meaning. Last but not least, how can something that precedes something serve as an extension anyway? Observing Turkey through blinkers An attitude similar to that of the Financial Times’ Strauss in terms of taking unsubstantiated allegations of unreferenced sources as a credible, as well as a “necessary and sufficient” premise for a conclusion about the contemporary situation in Turkey, is visible in the reporting of Zaman of the Economist and Berlinski, who writes for City Journal magazine. In an analysis on Turkey for The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Zaman argues that there are three sources of pressure on media freedom in Turkey: first, Turkey’s anti-terror laws; second, its prime minister, Erdoğan; and third, “Turkey’s largest and most powerful Islamic fraternity led by Fethullah Gülen.” What is her premise for such a dogma-like conclusion? She writes: “The so-called Gülenists are said to have infiltrated the bureaucracy, especially the police force. They are widely believed to be behind the arrest of Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener.” As such, she either makes the same mistake that Strauss does or pursues the same insidious method to obscure the facts and lead readers to make erroneous conclusions. Who is it that says and believes so? And, why is it that an ordinary Turkish citizen with a favorable opinion of Gülen is said to have infiltrated the bureaucracy when he or she enters the civil service through legal and legitimate procedures available to any other Turkish citizen? While she does not provide any answer to this, neither does she mention that the same judiciary prosecuting Şık and Şener for their alleged involvement in alleged coup plots also opened some 400 lawsuits against journalists and reporters working for the Zaman newspaper for issues related to their reporting. Finally, in her article “Prisoner of Conspiracy,” Berlinski argues: “So the [Ergenekon] investigation cannot possibly lead to what its supporters say it will: the triumph of the rule of law in Turkey, a sustainable national consensus, and a verdict widely accepted as legitimate. It can only lead to more division, suspicion, and paranoia.” She further argues, “Almost every Turkish citizen now deeply believes either that Ergenekon is real or that Gülen is running their country—and is truly terrified of one or the other.” Does she not sound more like someone with a stake in the Ergenekon investigation than a correspondent? Or, why could she possibly be following this particular pattern in her reporting? The answer seems to be in her proposal, “The only solution I can imagine would lie in a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Committee -- an entirely public and transparent reckoning aiming not at punishment or vengeance but at reconciliation.” Just like Strauss and Zaman, Berlinski too tries to spread the false perception that Gülen is running the show in Turkey and the Ergenekon investigation is leading to an uncertainty. Perhaps, they or those who sign their paychecks think that if they can portray Gülen as poorly and as frighteningly as possible, then the Ergenekon investigation may be brought to a halt. * Mehmet Kalyoncu is an independent political analyst and author of “A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gülen Movement in Southeast Turkey.”

Is the Gülen Movement a Religious Order? *

M. Enes Ergene

Even though the essential dynamics of the Gülen movement look similar to those of the classical Islamic tradition of spiritual orders in certain aspects, its organization is different with regard to producing civil initiatives and its way of acculturation. Max Weber's concept of "worldly asceticism" can help analyze the Gülen movement only to a certain degree. Instead, it is a movement that has been organized by civil dynamics. The Gülen movement is defined by modesty, self-sacrifice, altruism, devotion, togetherness, service without expectations, and by a depth of the spirit and heart with no anticipation for personal gain for any intention or deed. These are all concepts of Sufi culture, and these are also among the intellectual and active dynamics of the movement. But these concepts do not only relate to a person's own inner world, as in some Sufi orders; they are also directed to the outside, to what is social, to the same degree. In that respect, the awareness of religious depth and servanthood to God has more all-encompassing and social aims. Weber views such action as a "rationalization of religious and social relations." But even such a notion does not fully encompass the rational and social dynamics of the Gülen movement.

Religious orders are directed toward both the personal and the private. They make the individual grow cool toward the world and direct him or her to experience spiritual challenges at a personal level. Even though he or she is not removed entirely from social life, a religious order instills a rigid sense of discipline so as to allow little space for new openings. The Gülen movement differed in that it is inspired by a philosophy that is akin to that of Rumi (d. 1273), Yunus (d. 1321), and Yesevi (d. 1165), which is embedded in a wider social context.[1] It is like a contemporary projection of the message of these historical Sufis. In this projection, "religious motive" and "social action" work in great harmony. Just as elements of self-discipline mature the person, they make him or her a participant in shared aims in the social sense. Gülen's understanding of service requires a genuine spirit of devotion. This fits in with the ascetic definition of Weber, and yet it is a dynamic that is broader and has greater continuity.

Gülen invites Muslims to fulfill the pillars of Islam (daily prayers, fasting, charity, pilgrimage) by taking modern conditions into consideration. He instills a broad understanding of charity to include the gifts of time and effort, not just money; he similarly conveys the idea that prayer is not just for us, but also for others. Thus, taking these as his starting point, Gülen's definition of "service" becomes both broad and continuous, extending to national, human, moral, and universal values. It adopts a rational attitude toward the basic values of state and nation. When one speaks of a "person of service," one refers to a person with a vast heart who can embrace a wide perspective, selfless service, and devotion. And this requires a transcending love for religion, for nation, and for humanity. That is why Gülen frequently refers to those who are filled with such a transcendent love, and ready to face any challenges on this path, as "muhabbet fedaileri" (guardians of love).

[1] These Sufi figures of Turkish history are considered to represent the most welcoming interpretation of Islam. Their poetry and exemplary life stories have been narrated generation after generation.

* Ergene, E. (2008). Tradition Witnessing Modern Age: An Analysis of the Gulen Movement (p. 18). Somerset, NJ: Tughra Books.

Time to counter global lies

Ekrem Dumanlı

At one time in this country, the media would write lies, distort stories and mislead the public and no one would be able to say anything against them. Coups were staged, memorandums were released, groups of people were discredited and individuals were defamed with those lies. For several decades, the public was misguided because there wasn't an alternative news source. 

It's impossible for lies to go on forever. And they didn't. Fortunately, Turkey was able to end the practice of false journalism. A casually released piece of information no longer becomes the subject of serious analysis 10 minutes later. When lies are told, they become exposed instantly. It is for this reason that fictional stories about reactionaryism are no longer written. Those who fabricate stories know very well that other media organizations will quickly access the people, places and witnesses mentioned in the false story and expose the true side of the story.

With the lie machine broken and incorrect information being defeated by correct information, some people have changed their strategies. Now false information and distorted analyses are being made abroad. Some people are knocking on the doors of think tanks and reporting developments in Turkey incorrectly, some people are providing analyses to prominent newspapers and magazines based on groundless information, and some are disclosing information about Turkey to foreign diplomats even though they know it is untrue.

Certain people (and even some institutions and organizations) who are speaking with certain lobbies and trying to take control of Turkey with the help of outsiders are relentlessly trying to undermine two social realities. Firstly, they want to spread animosity toward the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) among the global public, and secondly they want to infect foreigners with paranoia about theGülen movement. The sad part is that neither of these two structures is fully aware of the terrible game they are up against. They approach the issue with the courage brought on by being honest and continue on their democratic and peaceful ways believing that "a lie never lives to be old." In a sense, they are right. The public conscience always sees the truth sooner or later. But what if the mud that is thrown leaves a stain?

There's always a possibility that journalist or academicians can misinterpret events. But an honorable intellectual should never submit to false information. The dreadful situation before us stems from misinformation rather than misinterpretation. The most upsetting part is that some people are creating false information on purpose and are trying to distort historical facts. Unfortunately, some of the efforts out there have nothing to do with journalism or academic studies -- instead they are the works of agents of influence.

For example those who could not undermine the Ergenekon case in Turkey are trying to achieve this objective abroad. While this may engender an opportunity that foreign forces have been waiting for, what's important is the truth. Several coups have been staged in this country, several memorandums have been released, and several interventions have been made into democracy. There have been torture cases, assassinations and mysterious murders. The deep structure that killed people and sparked clashes between Kurds and Turks, Alevis and Sunni, rightist and leftist, secularist and anti-secularist for their own purposes became exposed in the Ergenekon case. There are weapons, bombs, assassination plots and plans, murders, and projects to destroy individuals and groups of people.

Some people try to portray Ergenekon as an innocent association despite all the evidence and concrete information, and some even say the cases filed against journalists for writing about the Ergenekon are efforts to pressure the secular segment of society by the party in power. After all, how is a European or American supposed to know that some members of the judiciary who see themselves as a part of the deep structure are punishing people who write about the Ergenekon reality and that the democratically elected government of this country can't even stop it. Those who tell foreigners that around 5,000 to 6,000 cases have been launched against journalist in Turkey are doing so thinking they are hurting the AK Party. But neither the hostility toward the AK Party nor community paranoia can be used to explain these cases.

For example, they don't mention the link between the Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener incident and the dark room known as OdaTV.com. They don't talk about how plans were made at the office of OdaTV.com on how to defame people and how to intervene in politics nor do they explain the duties that were assigned to Şık and Şener in these plans. They have become obsessed with the "community." They are making people targets even though there is no evidence against them. Why is a group of people, who ignore concrete information and documents, blaming people without any information or evidence?

For many years, the perceptive media in this country has fought against false news stories and has cracked down on lies and slander. Fortunately, a new absurdity does not emerge every day like it used to. Now there is another test waiting for us: hunting down lies and distortions regardless of what part of the world it happens and regardless of whether it is being carried out behind a reputable brand or under the wings of a certain lobby. It's unimaginable for people who believe in Turkey's role in global balances and the honor of the profession of journalism to surrender to global lies. Just as we got rid of the roots of false news in Turkey we must eradicate it from the rest of the world as well. This is the only way to uphold the virtue of "searching for truth" which is the spirit of journalism.

If prime suspect's son-in-law is "objective" then

A conference was organized at Harvard University last week. According to the program, Orhan Kemal Cengiz was speaker. Dani Rodrik, the son-in-law of retired Gen. Çetin Doğan, a suspect in the Sledgehammer case, tried to dissuade people from listening to the writer speak at the conferences. This was not the first time he did something like this. Why? Apparently, Cengiz, who has worked as a lawyer on behalf of non-Muslim citizens who were killed in the Zirve massacre, who is known for his work on human rights and who writes for Today's Zaman, was "biased." Etyen Mahçupyan, who was earlier invited to a similar conference was also declared biased by Rodrik.

Mr. Rodrik does this all the time. He tries to prove that the Sledgehammer case is rubbish by writing for reputable newspapers and magazine. He targets the "AKP" (the acronym AKP is generally preferred by opponents of AK Party) and the community; he criticizes liberals and downgrades democrats.

So who is Rodrik? He is the son-in-law of the primary suspect in the Sledgehammer coup case. In other words, the son-in-law of a suspect can be objective, but Cengiz and Mahçupyan can't? Perhaps Rodrik's efforts to support his father-in-law are admirable, but isn't it disgraceful for him to pretend he's unbiased when he's writing articles left and write and trying to prevent people from attending a conference?

A shame and an injustice

Today's Zaman parted ways with Andrew Finkel. Things like this happen in journalism. The writer either loses faith in his newspaper or the newspaper feels the writer has become detached from its publication principles. Both reasons are valid in Finkel's departure. At this point, it doesn't matter who is right. The relationship cannot be forced. The sides talk and then part ways.

Finkel was a writer I valued and followed as well. His departure saddened me, but it did not surprise me. I could see from his latest articles published in Today's Zaman that he had lost faith in the newspaper. In such cases I think an honest journalist should shake hands with the editor-in-chief after parting ways. An "I don't believe in you any more, but I am going to continue writing for you anyway" type of attitude does not befit an honorable journalist.

For some reason Finkel's departure made some journalist working for Doğan Group very happy. They wrote articles about and conducted interviews with him. We didn't say, "If you're so interested in him, give him a column." We knew they wouldn't. After all they probably didn't forget what he said about Aydın Doğan. Anyways. In his interview with Doğan Group, Finkel blamed the Zaman daily. He also said the Taraf daily was Zaman's vanguard. That was shameful, very shameful. It was an injustice to Zaman and to Taraf. Apparently, I didn't know Finkel very well.

A few days ago I learned that Finkel has started writing for the Taraf daily. Congratulations. I'm happy for him. His decision to start writing for the vanguard must be a new phase of his honorable struggle in his career. It would have been better if he had explained why Zaman and he parted ways to foreign media without distorting the facts. But let's say he said what he believed; then he should also come out and say, "Now I am working for Zaman's vanguard." Isn't this an injustice toZaman, Taraf and journalism in general?

Published on Today's Zaman, 08 May 2011, Sunday

Gülen: Smear campaign targets those promoting Turkish culture

Fethullah Gülen Turkish intellectual and scholar Fethullah Gülen has said a smear campaign – with accompanying propaganda -- is under way against people who exert the utmost efforts to introduce Turkish culture to the rest of the world, calling for common sense in reaction to the makers of the campaign and the propaganda.   “We can resort to self defense in the face of ruthless smear campaigns, accusations and attacks or make explanations or refutations against them. If there are people who insist on wrongdoing, then we can sue them for damages. These are our legal rights. But we will never act in a violent manner as they do. We will not show them our fists as they do to us. Even if they threaten to slap us, we will not respond to them with slaps,” Gülen said on Monday in his latest speech broadcast on website Herkul.org. Gülen's remarks came in clear response to a recent smear campaign against the Gülen movement and its followers. The Gülen movement is a group of volunteers engaged in interfaith and intercultural dialogue inspired by the ideas of Gülen, whose teachings promote mutual understanding and tolerance between cultures. Now residing in the US, Gülen has pioneered educational activities in a number of countries, along with efforts to promote intercultural and interfaith activities around the world. According to Gülen, there are some circles that wish to defame the Gülen movement around the globe. “They cause mischief in some place and spread it to the entire world thanks to the Internet and television.” However, he said his movement will never resort to unlawful or violent methods when responding to the bad deeds of those people. “The ones who show you their fists are not people of mind, soul or heart. They put humanitarian values under pressure and try to suppress those values. As a necessity of their character, such people may resort to hatred, aggression or using their fists. But you [followers of the Gülen movement] will display your own character, and you will never do the same [acts of violence] to them. … Since we are doing everything in a human-centric manner, then we have to become ‘handless’ to whom hits us and ‘tongueless’ to whom swears at us as Yunus [Emre, a great mystical Turkish poet] said. Even though others do not treat us in a humanitarian manner, we will never engage in efforts to retaliate against them. We will not even think of responding to their bad deeds with other bad deeds. We will fulfill the requirements of being a Muslim,” he added. Commenting on the requirements of being a Muslim, Gülen said “A real Muslim forgets all good things he did for people. When you try to remind him, he will not remember. But he remembers about all the bad things [he did to other people] even if it was 70 years ago. He repents to God as if he committed a murder any time he remembers them [bad things done to other people.] This is a real Muslim.” Additionally, Gülen said the movement became the target of attacks when it grew bigger and more popular. “They are fulfilling what their character requires them to do. They are attacking violently. There were fewer attacks in the past. It was not the center of much interest then. Thus, it was not much envied. … But one day came, and they [opponents of the Gülen movement] started to take the issue more seriously. They entrusted the issue [attacks against the movement] to international [intelligence] services.” The scholar also said followers or members of the movement should be very careful with regard to plans and attempts of opponents of the movement to “throw mud at the movement.” “These people [members of the Gülen movement] are serving in all corners of the world. If some people intend to throw mud at the movement, we should not allow them or provide them with expected means. A tiny mark on one of us may be attributed to the entire movement. No individual [member of the movement] should carry marks. He may lose his arm, head or life, if necessary, but he should avoid any mark on himself. We need to pay extra attention,” he stated. In addition, Gülen said he has been subjected to smear campaigns and insults for the past 40 years, but he did not even complain to God about bad deeds or mistakes of wrongdoers. He said he prayed to God to make those people return from their wrong deeds and mistakes. “This is our philosophy. Even if it seems hard to us and even if we are subjected to injustice, we should think in this way. I have been rolled over [subjected to injustice] after every coup d’état since 1960. It was what happened to me after the March 12 [1971] and Sept. 12 [1980] coups d’état. I am ready to give my life 50 times to a handful of soil of my country. I am yearning for my country here, but I have never asked God to send people who did all this to me to hell. I always prayed for them, asking him to show them his mercy.” Gülen added that if people treat one another with good feelings, then goodness will dominate the world. “I suppose that we need alliance and cooperation more than at any other time these days when we are all in bits due to secession and disaccord.” 09 May 2011, Monday / TODAY’S ZAMAN, İSTANBUL

Gülen movement becomes new target of scaremongers

Murat Tokay 

With no hope left to draw any benefit from a discourse on the “approaching reactionaryist threat,” some media outlets, military and judicial circles as well as politicians today seem to be intent on placing the Gülen movement on the target board as if the movement poses a threat for secular people and their lifestyles in the country.

Until a short while ago, some circles in Turkey were constantly trying to create fears and concerns in society, claiming that Turkey will be a country that is ruled by Shariah and that there is an imminent threat of reactionaryism. To prove their allegations, some media outlets constantly print photos of veiled women and men in Islamic attire.

The military released memorandums against the government, warning of Islamic reactionaryism in the country. In the last of these memos, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) released a memorandum against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government during the presidential election process of 2007. In the memorandum which was released against the AK Party’s presidential nominee, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, the TSK voiced its concerns about Gül’s secular credentials.

In the same year, thousands of people who were motivated by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) took to the streets to say no to the “Shariah rule” which they claimed would be brought Turkey by the AK Party.

Nowadays, the warnings about an “imminent reactionaryist threat” seem to have lost effect mainly because they failed to convince the majority of the nation, which ignored their warnings and brought the AK Party government to power again with a record 47 percent of the vote in 2007. Nevertheless, this time the same circles point their fingers at the movement led by respected scholar and Islamic thinkerFethullah Gülen, as if the movement is ruling the country behind the scenes and interferes in people’s lifestyles.

According to Professor Doğu Ergil, there is nothing surprising about the Gülen movement’s becoming a major target because this is what a power struggle requires. “The ones who have been waging this war are the same since the establishment of the republic. They share the same mentality. First, they scared people with communism, then they used separatism. Later, they made up the reactionaryism threat. When they saw that the reactionaryism discourse did not work, they found an alternative, which is the Gülen movement,” said Ergil.

In the latest occasion, the Gülen movement was placed on the target board following the crisis regarding the Transition to Higher Education Examination (YGS) held early this month. Allegations surfaced that the question booklets of the YGS were coded to reveal the correct answer if read in a certain way. Some circles alleged that this was done in favor of the students attending university preparation courses run by Gülen’s followers.

Professor Niyazi Öktem thinks individuals who lost their power politically and sociologically want to make others pay the cost of their incompetence and they target the Gülen movement. “These circles talk less about the reactionaryism threat today because they make this threat concrete by pointing their fingers at the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement and reactionaryism mean the same thing for them,” explained Öktem.

The Gülen movement was targeted again when several journalists were placed behind bars over their links to Ergenekon, a shadowy crime network which has alleged links to the state and suspected of plotting to topple the government. Groups affiliated with Ergenekon tried to create controversy over arrested journalist Ahmet Şık’s upcoming book on Gülen titled “İmamın Ordusu” (The Imam’s Army), saying the police and prosecutors sympathetic to Gülen’s ideas pushed for censuring the book.

Sociologist Yasin Aktay noted that the circles who now present theGülen movement as a threat began to do so after they saw that their claims of reactionaryism in Turkey found no support from the public. “These circles are trying to create an area of power for themselves through certain fears. This time they found another source of fear, which is the Gülen movement. Those who spoke about the reactionaryism threat yesterday are talking about the threat allegedly posed by the Gülen movement today,” he said.

Published on Today's Zaman, 12 April 2011, Tuesday